During the period 1816-1975, major powers engaged in ~.p~~.~~i-mately 2,25-se-rious disputes (situations in which military force was threatened or actually used), but only about 1 ~% of these disputes ended in war (Singer, 1979 
governmsats during serious disputes, and to predict the indiv~i~= ual threats and uses of force that they will undertake, including the ultimate act of going to war. To test the simulation, the actions of both Russia and Japan during a of disputes from 1~~~ to 1904 will be predicted. I begin by discussing the concept and operationalizations of the serious dispute and then turn to a description of the simulation. Finally, the disputes themselves, the model's predictions, and the fit of these predictions to the observed actions of the Russian and Japanese governments will be considered. (Rapoport, 1960 Operationally, a serious dispute is identified from the presence of the threats, displays, and uses of force that it produces. Thirteen types of threat, display, and use of force are coded in the data set, and twelve of these are used in this article. The model of governmental decision-making embodied in the simulation consists of four groups of decision rules arranged in an hierarchial structure (see Table 2 (Mackintosh, 1956) 
